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Average income per capita in the countries of the OECD was more than 20 times larger in 2000 than
that of the poorest countries of sub-Sahara Africa and elsewhere, and many of the latter are not only
falling behind the world leaders, but have even regressed in recent years.  At the same time, other low-income
countries have shown the capacity to make dramatic improvements in income per capita.  Two general
explanations have been offered to account for the observed patterns of growth.  One view stresses
differences in the efficiency of production are the main source of the observed gap in output per worker.
A competing explanation reverses this conclusion and gives primary importance to capital formation.
We examine the relative importance of these two factors as an explanation of the gap using 112 countries
over the period 1970-2000.  We find that differences in the efficiency of production, as measured by
relative levels of total factor productivity, are the dominant factor accounting for the difference in
development levels.  We also find that the gap between rich and most poor nations is likely to persist
under prevailing rates of saving and productivity change.  To check the robustness of these conclusions,
we employ different models of the growth process and different assumptions about the underlying
data.  Although different models of growth produce different relative contributions of capital formation
and TFP, we conclude that the latter is the dominant source of gap.  This conclusion must, however,
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The question of why economic growth differs among countries question has been asked 
over and over again, with increasingly better data and ever more sophisticated analytical 
techniques.
1  However, the answer remains elusive despite the many advances and growing 
insights into the problem.  Average income per capita in the countries of the OECD was more 
than 20 times larger in 2000 than that of the poorest countries of sub-Sahara Africa and 
elsewhere, and many of the latter are not only falling behind the world leaders, but have even 
regressed in recent years.
2  At the same time, other low-income countries have shown the 
capacity to make dramatic improvements in income per capita. 
  Two general explanations have been offered to account for the observed patterns of 
growth.  One view stresses differences in the efficiency of production are the main source of the 
observed gap in output per worker, which is the primary determinant of income per capita.  At 
the heart of this view is the idea that improvements in technology and the organization of 
production lead to higher levels of total factor productivity (TFP) in countries with institutions 
that support innovation and promote economic efficiency, along with factors like favorable 
geography, climate, and political stability. Lower levels of TFP are associated with institutions 
that inhibit or retard innovation and the diffusion of technology, or which have unfavorable 
environmental factors.  In either case, differences in the level of TFP, and not differences in 
capital formation, largely explain observed differences in income per capita in this view.
 3   
                                                           
1 This question is the organizing theme of the 1998 volume by Landes “The Wealth and Poverty of Nations.” Landes 
examines the historical and institutional context of the income disparities that are so apparent today, and describes 
many of the theories and perceptions of the accompanied the emergence of this gap.  All research on this issue owes 
a great debt to the pioneering work of Simon Kuznets, both for his historical insights and for his contributions to the 
development of the national accounting data that make quantitative analysis possible. The sources-of-growth 
analysis emerged from this effort, greatly advanced by Solow (1957), and applied international growth by Edward F. 
Denison (1967) and Maddison (1987).  
2  These estimates are based on the country groupings shown in the appendix to this paper, and the data on income 
per capita in derived from the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002).   
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  A competing explanation reverses this conclusion and gives primary importance to 
capital formation.  In this paradigm, capital is defined broadly to include human and knowledge 
capital, infrastructure systems, as well as the traditional categories of structures and equipment.  
TFP differences among countries are thought to be extinguished by the rapid diffusion of 
knowledge, and many papers in this branch of the literature then assume that technology is the 
same in every country.  Some papers also treat technology growth as largely endogenous via 
investments in knowledge and human capital, and stress the role of externalities.  To the extent 
that institutional differences play a role in explaining the income gap, they tend to be expressed 
through the rate of capital formation.
4   
The apportionment of the income gap between capital formation and TFP is ultimately an 
empirical issue.  However, this issue has not proved easy to resolve, in part because of parallel 
disputes about which theoretical models of growth are appropriate, the chief protagonists being   
endogenous growth theory and neoclassical growth theory.  There is also a question of whether it 
is differences in the rate of growth of output per worker or the corresponding levels that should 
be explained, and, with respect to the latter, the measurement of the TFP gap using Hicksian 
versus Harrodian measures of technical change.  Not surprisingly, the literature reveals that 
different assumptions and methods give different results, and one goal of this paper is to examine 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3  See Hall and Jones (1999) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) for recent examples of this approach, and for 
the reviews of the literature.  Bosworth and Collins (2003) also provide an extensive survey of recent work in this 
area, though their own empirical work focuses on rates of growth rather than productivity levels. Contributions to 
the measurement of international difference in the TFP levels were made by Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), while 
Färe et al (1994) is an important paper that uses Data Envelopment Analysis to measure technical efficiency 
(relative to best-practice) among countries. The translog index number approach used in this paper was developed 
by Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978), Christensen, Cummings, and Jorgenson (1981), and Caves, Christensen, and 
Diewert (1982a, 1982b).     
4 This literature is somewhat diverse. It includes Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and the other papers in what 
Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) term the “Neoclassical Revival.” See, also, Gollin (2002) for an argument 
supporting this view.  Some of the AK endogenous growth models also fit into this category.    
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just how large the difference is for a sample of high and low income countries over the period 
1970 to 2000.  Our procedure is to decompose the growth rate of output per worker into its TFP 
and capital-deepening components using competing methods, and compare the results.  We 
follow a similar procedure for the corresponding levels of output per worker, which we also 
decompose into TFP and capital-deepening components.  We then propose a similar 
decomposition for the Solow steady-state growth model, in order to examine whether the current 
gap in output per worker between rich and poor countries is likely to persist into the future given 
current parameters and policies, or whether the process of convergence can be expected to 
significantly narrow the gap. 
The second goal of this paper is to examine the problem of data quality.  If there is a 
dispute about the size of the TFP gap between rich and poor countries, there can be little doubt 
about the corresponding gap in the data quality.  Low-income countries tend to have large non-
market sectors for which data are problematic or non-existent, and a market sector with a large 
family business component in which labor income can appear as profit.  One result is an 
implausibly low share of income attributed to labor in national income statistics of these 
countries:  labor’s share averages around 30 percent of income in the poorest countries in the 
sample of this paper, compared to 50 to 60 percent in the richest.  Income shares typically serve 
as proxies for the corresponding output elasticities, which in turn are key determinants of the 
growth path in most models in the literature (generally, the larger the share of capital, the more 
important capital formation is relative to TFP as a source of growth).  As a result, many 
researchers reject the published data and either estimate the shares using econometric techniques 
using the assumption that the shares are constant over time and the same for all countries, or 
impose an external estimate of the labor and capital shares, typically two-thirds and one-third.    4 
 
These procedures essentially imply that every country has a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
which are identical up to a scalar multiple which is associated with the level of total factor 
productivity (which is also assumed to be the same for all countries in some formulations).  
There is a certain irony in this situation, in view the debate over the extent to which the variation 
in output per worker is due to differences in technology versus differences in capital formation.  
One objective of this paper is to reexamine the implications of the two-thirds/one-third share rule 
and robustness of the various growth decompositions to changes in this rule.   
                                                  II.  Empirical Growth Modeling 
  The diverse models in the empirical growth literature share certain common features that 
can be used to classify and compare them.  One core assumption is that the production 
possibilities of an economy can be characterized by a stable aggregate production function (or a 
variant of the production function like the cost function or the factor demand equations).  Since 
many of the differences in the literature can be traced to variations on this theme, we will we 
attempt to organize the various dimensions of the growth debate using this production 
framework.  Since the discussion is largely about fundamentals, we will use a simple graphical 
exposition adopted by Solow in his seminal paper on the sources of growth. 
A.  The Aggregate Production Function 
The aggregate production function relates aggregate output (Y) to total inputs of labor (L) 
and capital (K), with allowance for improvements in the productivity of these inputs.  This 
formulation is so widely used that its implications have become almost invisible in the analysis 
of growth.  However, it is important to acknowledge any analysis based on the aggregate 
production function asserts, in effect, that the complex technologies of the various firms and 
sectors that make up an economy can be summarized accurately by a single functional   5 
 
representation.  The difficulty, here, is that the technical conditions for consistent aggregation are 
so restrictive as to be intuitively implausible (see, for, example, Fisher (1965,1969)).  Thus, the 
use of the aggregate production functions can only be justified as a useful parable for organizing 
the data in a way that makes economic sense, and as a framework for interpreting empirical 
results.  The debate in the literature over which specification of the aggregation production 
function is ‘factually’ appropriate for the analysis of cross-national income differences must 
therefore be viewed accordingly.  
Technical change can be introduced into the aggregate production function in different 
ways, but the most are variants of the model in which the production function is written as Yt = 
F(Kt,Lt,t).  The time index t allows the production function to shift over time in order to capture 
improvements in the efficiency with which the inputs are used, and ‘technical change’ is 
conventionally defined as the partial derivative of F(Kt,Lt,t) with respect to t.  In the special case 
in which technical change augments both input proportionately, the production function has the 
Hick’s-neutral form Yt = AtF(Kt,Lt).  This is the most common form used in empirical growth 
accounting, following Solow (1957). 
 Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the Hicksian production function can 
be expressed in ‘intensive form’ as yt = AtF(kt), with the variables expressed relative to labor:  yt 
= Yt/Lt and kt = Kt/Lt.  This form provides an explicit decomposition output per worker, yt, into 
the two effects of interest, the level of total factor productivity, At , and the capital-deepening 
effect, F(kt).  The standard graphical representation of the production model is shown in Figure 
1.  This figure portrays an economy initially located at the point a on the production function 
prevailing in that year (1970 in this example).  An increase in the efficiency index, from A70 to 
A00 in the year 2000, causes the production function to shift upward as in the figure.  This is   6 
 
often associated with the adoption of better technologies over time, but it actually represents a 
costless improvement in the effectiveness with which capital and labor are used, and it is more 
appropriately characterized as a change in total factor productivity (TFP).
5   
Output gets a further boost, in Figure 1, from an increase in the capital-labor ratio from 
k70 to k00.  Because of diminishing returns to capital, the production function is shown with a 
concave shape.  Each increment of capital per worker yields a proportionately smaller increase in 
output per worker.  With technology held constant, this increase is represented by the move from 
point a to point b on the lower A70 branch of the production function.  The total change in output 
per worker in Figure 1 is from y70 to y00, that is, from point a to point c, and is the sum of the 
capital deepening effect, from point a to point b, and the TFP effect, from point b to point c.  The 
relative size of these two effects is the point at issue in the capital versus efficiency controversy, 
and Figure 1 provides a framework for interpreting and measuring the two effects. 
                                              B.  Levels versus growth rates 
The empirical growth literature provides two ways to implement the intuition of Figure 1, 
one based on growth rates (growth accounting) and the other on levels (development 
accounting).  The answers can be very different, as the following example illustrates.  Suppose 
that there two economies, A and B, that both start with the same capital-labor ratio, k70.   
However, A and B have different levels of output per worker, because they start with different 
levels of productive efficiency, that is, Economy A is on the higher of the two production 
functions in Figure 1 at point e, and economy B on the lower one at point a.  Suppose that, from 
                                                           
5  TFP excludes the systematic development of technology paid for by R&D expenditures, but includes the part 
resulting from R&D externalities, learning, or pure inspiration. In addition, it includes changes in organizational 
efficiency, and institutional factors such as the legal and regulatory environment, geographic location, political 
stability, as well as deeper cultural attitudes that affect the work place. It also sweeps in all other factors not 
explicitly included in measured input: omitted variables like infrastructure capital, variations in the utilization of 
capital and labor (e.g., unemployment), and measurement errors (for further discussion, see Hulten (2001)).   7 
 
this staring point, both economies only grow by capital deepening, which proceeds at the same 
rate of growth.  They then move along their respective production functions at the same rate, but 
neither experiences any growth in productivity (neither function shifts).  In this example, the 
entire growth rate in output per worker is due to capital deepening, but all the difference in the 
level of output per worker is due to the different level of productive efficiency.  Moreover, 
economy B may become richer over time, but will never narrow the gap with economy A. 
This simple example illustrates the insufficiency of studying comparative growth rates in 
isolation from the corresponding levels.  Studying comparative levels at a given point in time is 
also insufficient, since it cannot indicate the growth dynamics and future prospects of the rich 
and poor countries. 
                                          C.  Econometrics versus Nonparametrics 
A number of different estimation procedures have been used in empirical growth 
analysis.  Some studies use an econometric approach in which the production function in Figure 
1 is given an explicit functional form and the parameters of that form are estimated.
6  Flexible 
functional forms like the translog and generalized-Leontieff forms are common in pure 
production function studies (or dual cost function and factor demand studies), but are not entirely 
suitable for the study of low-income countries, which tend to have both inadequate and 
incomplete data.  The Cobb-Douglas form Yt = A t Kt
" Lt
$  is often used, either explicitly or 
implicitly.   
Direct estimation of the production function suffers from another well-known problem.  
The production function is only one equation in a larger system that determines the evolution of 
                                                           
6  The specification of the error structure of the production function is also an important issue in the growth and 
production literature. The common approach is to assume an i.i.d. error structure, which is symmetrically distributed 
around the production function. An alternative approach is to use a one-sided error term, which then allows the error 
to be associated with departures from the efficiency frontier.        8 
 
the system.  Kt is determined endogenously in the larger system through the savings/investment 
process, and direct estimation can lead to simultaneous equations bias.  The use of instrumental 
variables is one way to deal with this problem, while another approach is to estimate the reduced 
form of the growth system. This second option is the used in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) 
to estimate the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas function indirectly from the reduced form of the 
Solow (1956) growth model. 
 However, both approaches have their drawbacks (e.g., it is difficult to find good 
instruments) and nonparametric techniques provide an alternative. The two main alternatives are 
the Solow (1957) growth-accounting model and the Data Envelopment Analysis approach, 
although the former (as extended by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967)) is much more widely used 
in the growth analysis.  The Solow model provides an accounting framework, based on the 
Divisia index, in which the growth rate of output per worker (yt) is equal to the growth rate of 
capital per worker (kt) weighted by capital’s income share in GDP, plus a residual factor that 
accounts for all the remaining growth in yt not explained by the weighted growth of kt.
7 Solow 
shows that, under the assumption that prices are equal to marginal costs, the income shares are 
equal to output elasticities, and the share-weighted growth rate of  kt is associated with the 
movement along the production function from a to b in Figure 1, i.e., with capital deepening, and 
the residual is associated with the shift in the production from b to c.  The Solow sources-of-
growth decomposition thus provides a method of resolving the growth rate of yt into the capital-
deepening effect and the TFP effect. 
                                                           
7 Since accounting data do not come in a continuous time format, the discrete time Törnqvist approximation is 
typically used in the actual calculations. Growth rates are approximated by the change in the natural logarithms of 
the variables, weighted by the average income share from one period to the next.         9 
 
  The non-parametric growth accounting approach was extended to the analysis of growth 
rate to the analysis of the corresponding levels by Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978), and 
developed by Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (CCD, 1982a).  The CCD model is a Törnqvist 
index of the level of productivity in each country relative to the average of all countries.  It 
measures the TFP of any country, relative to the average of all countries, by comparing the 
percentage deviation of yt from its international mean with the percentage mean deviation of kt, 
weighted by the average of the country’s own income share and the international average.  
Because deviations are computed relative the average of all countries, the frame-of-reference 
problem implicit in using any one country as the base is avoided.   The result is a non-parametric 
decomposition of the relative gap in yt between into its TFP level and capital deepening 
components, which complement the sources-of-growth rate analysis.
8   
                                          D.  Hicks versus Harrod neutrality. 
  The non-parametric approach also suffers from a form of simultaneous equations bias 
implicit in the endogeneity of capital.  A shift in the production function at a given capital-labor 
ratio leads to an increase in output per worker and some of this extra output is saved, leading to 
more output, more saving and so on.  In Figure 1, the shift in technology from a to e is the 
impetus to this effect, and the extra capital induced by the shift is represented by the movement 
along the upper production function from e to c.  This is the “induced accumulation effect”, and 
it should be counted as part of TFP, not as exogenous capital formation, in assessing the 
importance of TFP as a driver of growth (Hulten (1975)).   
                                                           
8  The non-parametric and functional form approaches are operationally separate, but Diewert (1976) shows that in 
order to the Törnquist index to be exact representation of the technology, there must exist an underlying production 
function of the translog form. This parallels the result by Hulten (1973) that there must be an underlying Hicksian 
production function in order for the Solow-Jorgenson-Griliches index of total factor productivity to be path 
independent.     10 
 
  The induced accumulation effect can be captured by measuring the shift in the production 
function along a constant replacing capital-output ratio, rather than at a constant capital-labor 
ratio as in the Hicksian case.  This idea, which can be traced back to Harrod (1948), is 
represented in Figure 1 by the movement along the pay from the origin (OP) from a to c.  It is 
clear from this figure that all of the growth in output is accounted for by the shift in the 
production function, measured along the constant K/Y ray.  However, since the Harrodian gap is 
measured along a given K/Y ratio, it is not a pure measure of the efficiency with which existing 
resources are used (the normal conception of productivity).  Thus, it does not measure a 
country’s distance to the best-practice technology frontier, nor the difference in the technological 
opportunities separating two countries.  It does, however, measure the consequence of a 
country’s move to a higher level of technology. 
  The situation portrayed along the line OP in Figure 1 is one of balanced growth with 
Harrod-neutral technical change.  We will examine the growth implications of this case in more 
detail in a subsection that follows, but the measurement implications are worth noting here.  
Harrod-neutral technical change can be expressed analytically as pure labor-augmenting 
technical change in the production function Yt = F(Kt,atLt).  This is a restricted form of the more 
general technology Yt = F(Kt,Lt,t), and is a different restriction from the Hicksian form Yt = 
AtF(Kt,Lt) underlying the Solow residual.
9   In the labor-augmenting case, the goal is to measure 
the shift parameter at, which determines the evolution of technical efficiency. 
  However, it is important to recognize that technical change need not be Harrod neutral – 
labor-augmenting technical change is a highly restrictive assumption in light of the IT revolution 
                                                           
9  An identification problem arises when the technology has the Cobb-Douglas form. In this case, Yt = Kt
" (atLt
$), 
which can be written as Yt = at
$ Kt
" Lt
$.  This is equivalent in measurement terms to the Hicks-neutral form Yt = A t 
Kt
" Lt
$.  The identification problem is compounded when all countries are assumed to have a common $, the typical 
case in international growth comparisons.      11 
 
– and that, in any event, it is important to distinguish between the definition of technical change 
and the parametric specification of technical change.  The standard definition is given in terms of 
the partial derivative of the production function with respect to time, holding inputs constant.  
Under the Harrodian definition, the time derivative is assessed holding K/Y constant.  Both 
definitions can be applied to the same function, and this function need not exhibit either Hicksian 
or Harrodian neutrality.  For example, if the actual equilibrium point y00 were to lie somewhere 
to the right of c in Figure 1, the shift in the function would still be measured along the line P 
from a to c, regardless of the underlying technology.  Under the Harrodian definition, the 
increase in y00 beyond c would be attributed to autonomous capital formation, even though 
technical change is Harrod-biased.    
    In practical terms, the residual estimate of TFP generated by the latter can be converted 
to the Harrodian residual by diving by labor’s shares of income.
10  The Hicksian and Harrodian 
definitions therefore give very different results, leading to the question of which convention is 
the ‘right’ one to use.  The answer is that both are right, but for different questions.  In order to 
find out how efficiently existing labor and capital are used, the Hicksian approach is the right 
way to proceed.  However, if the question is about the relative importance of capital deepening 
versus efficiency change as the cause of growth, the Harrodian model gives the better answer, 
since capital formation is endogenous.  Both are important and are complements rather than 
substitutes, but it is also important not to lose sight of which question is being answered.  Thus, 
for example, in international comparisons of the technology gap that use the Harrodian 
                                                           
10   Hulten (1979) proposes a way to capture the induced accumulation effect without imposing either Hicksian of 
Harrodian forms of technical change, by treating capital as an intertemporal intermediate good.  The resulting 
estimate of productivity change is shown to be the weighted sum of the Hicks-based residual, and to reduce to the 
Harrod-based residual when technical change happens to be Harrod neutral.  Empirical work based on this 
framework reveals a substantial induced accumulation effect across countries (Hulten and Nishimizu, 1978).   
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convention, e.g., Klenow and Rodriquez-Care (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999), the estimated 
gap should not be interpreted as a measure of the distance from the best-practice technologies of 
the rich countries, since the size of it depends on the rate of saving.   
                                                     E.  Endogenous Growth 
 Capital is not the only growth factor that is endogenous.  Much of technical innovation is 
the result of systematic investments in education and research, and is thus part of overall 
(endogenous) capital formation.  Moreover, in the framework developed in Lucas (1988) and 
Romer (1986), investments in education and research generate spillover externalities.  These 
externalities may be sufficiently large that growth becomes endogenously self-sustaining, 
yielding the “AK” version of the model.
11 
  All the growth rate of output is due to capital formation in the pure AK model.  Thus, it 
would appear that the sources-of growth analysis of this case would generate sources-of growth 
estimates that attribute all of output per worker to capital, both in the rate of change and the level 
(that is, the TFP column would contain nothing but zeroes).  However, this presumes that the 
extent of the externality is known.  When it is not, and this is the normal case when growth-
accounting data are derived from observed market transactions, it is not hard to show that the 
Solow residual measures the externality component of capital’s contribution.
12  The TFP residual 
now registers the externality effect, and TFP is reinterpreted accordingly.   By implication, 
                                                           
11 This can be illustrated by the Cobb-Douglas production on the preceding sections.  That function can be expressed 
as yt = Atkt
α, where α and β are the capital and labor output elasticities.  In the standard neoclassical case of constant 
returns to scale, α+β = 1.  In the endogenous growth case, the capital variable also throws off an externality, γ, so 
that yt = A0kt
γ kt
α.  With α+γ = 1, the production function becomes yt = A0kt, a simple version of the “AK” model.
 
12 In the endogenous growth case, yt = A0kt
γ kt
α.  The Solow residual is based on the formulation yt = At kt
α, implying 
that the TFP level index is At = A0kt
γ. In other words, TFP growth is entirely a function of capital formation in a 
pure endogenous growth situation.  Conceptually, the apparent shift in the neoclassical production function is the 
result of the spillover externality.  Endogenous growth theory can therefore be regarded as supplying one rationale 
for the shift in the production function, a shift that has been termed ‘a measure of our ignorance’ by Abramovitz 
(1956).
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differences in the growth rates and levels of TFP across countries are explained by externalities 
and driven by capital formation.  
                                                 F.  Steady-State Growth Models 
The decompositions discussed thus far provide a backward-looking diagnosis of 
economic growth performance and its causes.  Past performance is certainly a guide to the 
economic future, but it is not sufficient for forecasting the path ahead.  It may be the case that a 
current income gap exists between two countries, but if they are converging to the same steady-
state level of output per worker, their long-run economic futures will be the same.  On the other 
hand, if one country is on a higher level of technology than another, both now and in the future, 
it will continue to be an income gap despite the convergence of kt to its steady-state path. 
To study where countries are heading in the future requires a model that specifies more 
that just the production function, since the evolution of capital, labor, and technology must also 
be specified.  The most fully developed empirical model that fits these requirements is the 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) – henceforth MRW – model of neoclassical steady-state 
growth.  MRW start with an augmented version of the Solow (1956) steady-state growth model 
and assume that all countries have the same Cobb-Douglas production function.  They then solve 
the Solow model for its reduced form, which makes steady-state output per worker, y*, a 
function of the following variables and parameters:  the rate of saving in each country, σi, the 
rate of growth in the labor force, ηi, the depreciation of capital, δ, and the Harrodian rate of 
technical change, λ.  MRW then observe that actual output per worker, yt, converges to the 
steady-state value according to an error-correction process that involves the rate of convergence.  
They proceed to use their reduced form equation to estimate the Cobb-Douglas output 
elasticities, α and β, and the rate of convergence to steady state.   14 
 
This approach is useful for the current purpose of decomposing steady-state output per 
worker into its long-run technology and capital formation components.  The left-hand variable, 
y*, can be estimated for each country given estimates of σi, ηi, δ, λ, as well as estimates of the 
elasticities α and β using income shares.  The estimated y* is the level of output per worker 
toward which the actual level at any point in time, yt, is converging.  Like yt, the estimated y* 
must necessarily satisfy the production constraint, y* = A0(k*)
α, where k* is the steady-state 
value of capital per worker.  This provides a natural decomposition of y* into the two 
components of interest, but one that is inherently forward looking.  Moreover, the steady-state 
income gaps for any two countries, or groups of countries, can be compared and the size of the 
gap similarly decomposed into the two effects.  We carry out both types of level comparison in 
the empirical section which follows, along with a decomposition of the growth rate of y* into its 
steady-state TFP and capital components.     
                                            III.  Data and Empirics 
  The various theoretical approaches reviewed in the preceding section present a rich set of 
options for empirical work.  They also present a challenge, because they offer different views 
and competing estimates of the same underlying growth process.  We will explore, in this 
section, just how much the competing estimates differ.  We start with the neoclassical sources-
of-growth model and the Hicksian convention for measuring TFP.  This is by far the most 
common approach in the empirical growth literature and the one with the largest body of results. 
                                        A.  The Data Sources and Data Problems 
The sources-of-growth framework requires times series data on real output, labor input, 
capital stocks, and labor’s share of income.   These data are constructed for a total of 112 
countries over the period 1970-2000.  The list of countries, along with selected statistics, is   15 
 
shown in Table A.1 of the Data Appendix.  In order to facilitate comparison, these countries are 
grouped into six ‘meta’ countries, mainly based on the World Bank classification by income per 
capita (not output per worker, which is highly correlated but not identical).  The 40 Low Income 
countries are located in Africa, with eight exceptions.  The 22 Lower-Middle Income countries 
are developing economies spread throughout the world, as are the 17 Upper-Middle Income 
countries.  The 24 High-Income countries are basically those of the OECD.  In addition, we have 
constructed two small meta-countries:  four “Old Tigers” (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, 
and Taiwan), and five “New Tigers” (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand). 
  Our principal data source is the Penn World Tables 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 
2002), from which real GDP (chain weighted) and real investment are obtained (both in power 
purchasing parity 1996 US dollars), as well as our labor force estimates. Real investment is used 
to compute the capital stock in international prices (details of this computation are given in the 
Appendix).
13, 
14    
The PWT data yield the estimates of yt and kt required by the sources-of-growth model.  
The final piece of data used in the paper, the country labor income shares, β, can be obtained 
from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook (various issues) and is simply computed as 
                                                           
13 In the few cases where there were missing end years to the data series we have used the growth rate of real GDP 
in US$, published in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2004, and extrapolated our data based on 
these. For a more thorough discussion of the data and adjustments made to the data on labor force, we refer the 
reader to Isaksson (2007). 
14  Bosworth and Collins (2003) argue that capital goods valued in national prices are a better reflection of the 
capital costs faced by each country.  They show that PPP-based capital stocks estimates have higher growth rates 
than the corresponding estimates using national prices, and that the former thus lead to an understatement of the TFP 
performance of poor countries.  As a result, we constructed estimates based on national prices obtained from World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2004), for the 83 (out of 112) countries that had data for this comparison.  
The results for these two versions of capital are shown in Table A2 of the Appendix, for our six meta countries. 
While Table A2 generally supports the findings of Bosworth and Collins, the differences are not large enough to 
alter the results based on the more widely accepted PPP approach.  The main difference arises in the Low Income 
meta country, where TFP growth does come to dominate.  However, all of the growth rates for this case are quite 
close to zero.  We have therefore opted to use the conventional PPP approach in this paper, but note that this is yet 
another area where data issues are importance, and where more work needs to be done.   16 
 
Compensation to Employees in GDP.  As noted in the introduction, these estimates of are 
suspiciously low, ranging from 0.30 for the Low Income countries to 0.55 in the High Income 
(see Figure A.2).  As noted in the introduction, this situation undoubtedly reflects an undercount 
of the income accruing to labor, especially in Low Income countries where there are many self-
employed and family workers, and many undocumented workers in the non-market economy.  
This has led a number of researchers to work with an externally imposed estimate of the factor 
shares, and a labor share of two-thirds and capital share of one-third is the typically employed.  
There is evidence to support this assumption, but also evidence against it.  In a recent paper, 
Rodriguez and Ortega (2006) find that capital’s income share in manufacturing industry declines 
by 6.25 percentage points for each log-point increase in GDP per capita.
15  We will not attempt 
to sort out this issue, but instead present three sets of sources-of-growth estimates, one set 
calculated with a two-thirds labor share, another based on the average measured share, and a 
third using the Rodriguez-Ortega rule. 
                                                 B.  Sources-of-Growth Estimates 
   These estimates of the conventional Solow residual are shown in Tables 1a, 1b, and1c, 
respectively.  The first column of Table 1a, which uses the two thirds/one third share rule as the 
basis for comparison, indicates that output per worker grew strongly over the period 1970 to 
2000 in the High Income countries, but was close to zero in the Low Income group.  The Lower 
Middle and Upper Middle Income meta countries display a positive growth experience, but still 
lag the growth rate of High Income leader.  The Old and New Tigers, on the other hand, 
outperformed the leader in terms of growth.  However, it is also the case that they started from a 
lower level of output per worker.    
                                                           
15 By contrast, Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) find that the elasticity of substitution – and hence the labor share – 
falls with income.   17 
 
The second and third columns of Table 1a show the sources-of-growth decomposition of 
the growth rate of output per worker into its capital-deepening and TFP components.  It is 
apparent that capital deepening is the predominant source of growth in the Low, Lower Middle, 
and Upper Middle Income countries, and that it accounts for about half of the growth in output 
per worker in the High Income.  The Tiger countries are the exception to this pattern with TFP as 
the main source of growth, but not by a very large margin.  These estimate speak directly to the 
question posed in Figure 1 about the relative magnitudes of the growth rates associated with the 
effects (a to b) and (b to c):  capital deepening, not TFP, is the dominant effect in the poorer low-
growth countries, but this changes as the growth rate of output per worker rises.  These results 
also speak to the debate whether capital deepening or productivity change is the main driver of 
growth (the ‘perspiration versus inspiration’ issue, as Krugman (1994) puts it).  The estimates of 
Table 1a suggest that both perspiration and inspiration have important roles in a successful 
program of economic development.  The finding that TFP grew rapidly in the (Old) Tigers stands 
in stark contrast to Young (1992, 1995), who argued that the contribution of TFP was only a 
negligible part of the East Asian miracle.  
  However, there is an important caveat.  A comparison of the Low Income and High 
Income cases indicates that nearly sixty percent of the cross-sectional difference in the growth 
rate of yt between the high income meta country and the others is due to difference in TFP 
growth rates.  In other words, capital deepening is the dominant source of growth over time in all 
but the most rapidly growing countries, but TFP is a more important factor in explaining cross-
sectional differences in growth performance.  These results are very consistent with the estimates 
of Bosworth and Collins (2003), who use a similar set of assumptions and methods.   18 
 
  The results shown in Table 1b replay Table 1a using the average measured share of labor 
income, β, as estimated from the data (see Table 6).  Since the share in the sources-of-growth 
model is a surrogate for the associated output elasticity, the shift to the measured β greatly 
decreases the output elasticity of labor and increases that of capital, thereby giving greater 
weight to the growth rate of kt and strengthening the capital-deepening effect.  In the case of 
Low Income countries, for example, the increase in the capital elasticity is from 0.33 to 0.71, and 
the effect of this change is evident in the second and third columns of Table 1b.  Capital 
deepening is now the overwhelmingly dominant source of growth over time in all the meta 
countries, although TFP is a still an important factor in explaining cross-sectional differences in 
growth performance, with the exception of the most rapidly growing countries.  
  The estimates of Table 1c offer a view of the sources of growth that is intermediate 
between the fixed 1/3-2/3 shares of Table 1a and the average measured labor shares of Table 1b.  
The shares in this case are based on the Rodriguez and Ortega (2006) finding that capital’s 
income share in manufacturing industry declines by 6.25 percentage points for each log-point 
increase in GDP per capita.  We apply this factor to the base value of capital’s share in the High 
Income meta country, which we take to be 0.67.  Because the Rodriguez-Ortega adjustment 
generally increases capital’s weight, capital deepening is now the leading source of growth in 
every meta country.  However, estimates are much closer to those of Table 1a than 1b, and a 
major change occurs only in the New Tiger countries. 
  These three tables are based on estimates of capital stock derived using PPP price 
deflators.  The Bosworth-Collins warning about the sensitivity of the results to the choice of 
price deflator bears repeating here.  The use of national price deflators does give a somewhat   19 
 
different view of the problem, and this should be borne in mind when interpreting the results.  
This is one more data issue to which more attention needs to be paid.      
                          C.   The Sources of Development Estimates 
Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c approach the analysis of growth by examining the rate of growth of 
yt and the fraction explained by capital deepening and TFP.  The sources-of-development 
analysis examines the parallel issue about the corresponding levels:  what fraction of the level of 
yt is explained by the level of the capital-deepening effect and the TFP effects, that is, what is the 
actual magnitude of the distances (a to b) and (b to c) in Figure 1, and how much of the overall 
gap (a to c) do they explain?   
Recall, here, the example in which economies A and B grow by capital deepening alone, 
but one starts at a higher level of TFP.  In that example, the entire growth rate in output per 
worker is due to capital deepening, but all the difference in the level of output per worker is due 
to the different level of productive efficiency.  Table 2, which is based on the conventional 
income shares, 1/3-2/3, suggests that a weaker form of this phenomenon occurs for many of the 
countries in our sample.  The first column of this table reports the level of output per worker in 
the first five meta countries relative to the level of the High Income countries.  This column 
conveys the same sense of the gap between rich and poor countries seen in Figure 2, which plots 
the paths of yt over time for the four largest groups of countries and the Tigers. The second 
column of Table 2 shows the relative levels of TFP, based on Caves, Christensen, and Diewert 
(1982a).  It is clear from this table that the level of TFP in the first five meta countries is 
significantly below that of the High Income countries, and, while similar in pattern, are 
somewhat more compressed than the relative levels of output per worker.  The latter is 16 times 
greater in the High Income countries compared to the Low, while the gap in productive   20 
 
efficiency is ‘only’ a factor of 5.  Figure 2 displays the time series trends that correspond to 
column 2.  It reveals the same general magnitude as the relative TFP estimates of Table 2, and 
also indicates that the gap has widened over time for the Low, Lower Middle, and Upper Middle 
countries, but that the Tiger countries (Old and New) are narrowing the gap in the relative TFP 
level. 
The last three columns of Table 2 decompose the level of output per worker into its 
capital-deepening and TFP components. This decomposition is based on the assumption that the 
production function has the simple constant-returns Cobb-Douglas form yt = Atkt
(1-β) (again, this 
is implicit in the assumption of a constant value of the labor share, β).  The variable At is the 
basis for TFP in the Solow model, and the level of TFP can thus be estimated by computing the 
ratio yt/kt
(1-β).  This ‘CD’ index is not necessarily equivalent to the CCD index, but when the β 
shares have the same value for each country, and the Cobb-Douglas index is normalized to the 
High Income countries, it gives the same values as the CCD index (thus, the numbers in columns 
2 and 3 are identical). 
  To assess the relative importance of capital deepening and TFP on the level of 




(1-β).  This decomposition is shown in the last three columns of Table 2, where it is apparent 
that the TFP is the predominant factor explaining the level of output per worker.  Moreover, a 
little more than half of the cross-sectional variation among countries is explained by the 
difference in the level of TFP.  This is the disconnect between the growth-rate analysis of Table 
1a and the level analysis of Table 2 noted above.  For example, TFP growth explains none of the 
growth rate in output per worker in the Low Income meta country, but the corresponding TFP 
level explains 66% of the level of output per worker.  For the Lower and Upper Middle meta   21 
 
countries, these numbers are 40% and 65%, and for the High Income case, they are 49% and 
64%.  This disconnect is diminished, but not absent, in the high growth Tiger meta countries. 
In other words, Table 1a suggests that their growth is propelled more by capital 
deepening rather than TFP growth, but Table 2 indicates that the main factor in explaining the 
large gap in output per worker is the persistently low levels of TFP in these countries (compare, 
also, Figures 2 and 3).  Not all of the 67 countries in the Low, Lower Middle, and Upper Middle 
income meta groups are subject to this pattern.  And, significantly, the Tiger countries display a 
convergence toward the High Income case, in both output per worker and in TFP levels, powered 
in part by a rapid rate of TFP growth.  This pattern suggests that, in the large, successful 
development programs are powered by an acceleration in TFP growth relative to that of the High 
Income leaders, and that the gap in TFP levels in thereby narrowed.  An acceleration in capital 
per worker is also an important (albeit lesser) factor.  Whether the former drives the latter, as in 
the Harrodian view, or vice versa, as in the endogenous growth view, cannot be learned from 
sources-of-growth estimates, but whatever the dynamics associated with TFP growth and levels, 
the estimates of Tables 1a and 2 assign a centrally important role to measured TFP.         
         D.  Empirical Results from the Harrodian and Endogenous Technology Approaches 
The Harrodian version of the growth decomposition is shown in the last two columns of 
Tables 1a-1c.  In practical terms, Harrodian TFP in column 5 is computed by dividing the 
corresponding Hicksian estimate in column 3 by labor’s income share.  This procedure results in 
a larger effect attributed to productivity, since part of the growth kt (the induced accumulation) is 
reassigned to TFP.   This result carries over from growth rates to levels, which are not shown, 
since in the common-share Cobb-Douglas case, the Harrodian levels are a simple power 
transformation (based on $) of the Hicksian level estimates of Table 2.   22 
 
  Endogenous growth theory implies a very different sources-of-growth decomposition.  
Where the Harrodian approach reallocates the induced-accumulation part of capital formation to 
TFP growth, the endogenous growth view reallocates the capital-induced part of TFP growth to 
capital formation.  In the most extreme form, all of TFP growth is endogenous.  If additional 
(endogenous growth) columns were added to Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c, with the capital-deepening 
effect shown in a sixth column and the TFP effect in a seventh, the new column 6 would equal 
the entire growth rate of output per worker, and the column 7 would contain nothing but zeroes.  
Since this decomposition is essentially trivial, from an expositional standpoint, it is not included 
in the various tables. 
                                       IV.  The Predictions of Growth Theory 
The insights offered in the preceding sections about the growth process and the income 
gap are inherently retrospective. They are based on the experience of past decades, but do not 
answer to the following question: if past trends persist into the future, will they be enough to lift 
a poor nation out of poverty?  Are the trends in TFP and capital formation such that the poorest 
countries will ultimately converge to the levels achieved by the rich and thereby extinguish the 
income gap?  These questions are inherently about future outcomes, and the answers require a 
fully-specified model of growth that takes into account the full range of factors that determine 
the future growth path. 
                     A.  Decompositions Based on Growth Models 
We have already encountered the two main contenders for this role:  the endogenous 
growth model and the neoclassical model of steady-state growth.  The growth dynamics of the 
former stress the role the capital formation and, in its AK form, predicts that those countries that 
are able to build an initial lead in capital per worker will be able to exploit the advantage and pull   23 
 
away from the others.  This prediction accords well with the pattern seen in Figure 2, and implies 
a fairly bleak outlook for the growth of the lower income countries.  However, it does not fit well 
with the experience of ‘transition’ economies like the Tigers that are able to accelerate growth by 
a combination of increased capital formation and more importantly, according to Table 1a, by 
even stronger TFP growth.  
The neoclassical model, as interpreted by MRW (1992), does allow for some countries to 
catch up to the leaders while others stagnate.  MRW solve for the reduced form of the Solow 
steady-state model when the technology of every country has the same Cobb-Douglas form and 
output elasticities.  They use the equation for steady-state output per worker, adjusted to allow 
convergence to steady-state, to estimate the elasticities.  In this paper, we take this equation to 
estimate steady-state output per worker for each meta country, y*, by using the ‘two-thirds/one-
third’ rule for the income share as an estimate of the Cobb-Douglas elasticities, and by 
estimating the other variables in the reduced form: the investment rate, σ, the rate labor force 
growth, η, the rate of depreciation, δ, the Harrodian rate of technical change, λ, and the level of 
TFP in the comparison year 2000, A2000.  
 The MRW model assumes the Cobb-Douglas form with constant returns to scale, so that 
y*t = Atk*t
(1-β).  The steady-state solution for y* in each of the six meta countries is shown in the 
first column of Table 3 for the last year in our sample, 2000.  The actual level of output per 
worker in 2000 is shown for comparison in the adjacent column.  The salient result is that there 
is a huge gap in output per worker between the Low and High Income countries (a ratio of 17 to1 
in 2000), and this gap is set to persist into the indefinite future.  Moreover, this is true even if the 
Low Income meta country’s rate of productivity growth λ were to improve to the rate prevailing 
in the High Income case. In fact, the Low Income country would have to improve the growth rate   24 
 
of TFP to that of the High Income country just to maintain the year 2000 gap.  If the λ’s shown 
in last column of Table 1a persist into the future, the gap will widen.  Similar remarks apply, to a 
lesser extent, for the Lower Middle and Upper Middle Income meta countries.  The steady-state 
picture is only bright for the Old Tiger countries, whose y*2000 is around one- half of the High 
Income amount, and whose λ is larger. 
The sources of the gap are examined in Table 4, which decomposes the gap between 
steady-state output per worker in the rich and poor countries into the separate contributions of 
capital-deepening and TFP.  This analysis is parallel to the sources-of-development level 
decomposition shown in Table 2, but the novelty here is that the decomposition refers to the 
long-run equilibrium contributions of the two sources when capital formation is endogenous 
(relative to a given rate of saving). 
The sources of the income gap are further examined in Table 4.  The difference in the 
level of steady-state output per worker is in the High Income meta country (H) compared to the 
Low Income (L) country is (y*H - y*L), which can be decomposed into two effects.  The first is 
the gap (y*L - yf), the distance between the L’s steady-state, y*L, and the point on its own 
production function that economy L would attain if it operated with the saving and population 
growth parameters rather than its own parameters, yf.  The second component of the 
decomposition is the distance between the two production functions, (yf  - y*L), as measured in 
the Harrodian way along the high income growth path.  This decomposes the steady-state output 
per worker gap into capital-deepening and efficiency effects based on the saving and population 
growth parameters of the high income country. 
A look at column 1 of Table 4 shows the dollar magnitude of the total gap (y*H - y*L) for 
each of the meta countries in the year 2000, while the next columns gives capital-deepening, the   25 
 
difference (yf  - y*L), and technology effects, (y*H - yf).  Several conclusions emerge from these 
estimates.  First, the large gap between the High Income countries and the others evident in 
Figure 2 appears to be a long-run situation as long as the basic parameters of growth remain 
unchanged (the exception here, as before, is the Tiger countries).  Second, the gap in output per 
worker is largely explained by the technology gap, not differences in the propensity to 
accumulate capital relative to the growing labor force (this is also apparent in the first two 
columns of Table 5, which express the Table 4 decomposition in percentage terms).  Finally, the 
forward-looking role played by TFP is even stronger than the role suggested by Figure 3.                                
However, this result must be qualified by the fact that the decomposition is not unique.  
We could equally decompose the steady-state output per worker gap into capital-deepening and 
efficiency effects based on the saving and population growth parameters of the low income 
country.  The third and fourth columns of Table 5 show the splits for these alternative paths (the 
‘Actual Income Path” for each country).  The alternative results are quite different, suggesting a 
high degree of path dependence, and to arrive at a single index, the average values for the two 
cases are shown in the last two columns of the table.   The results support the overall conclusion 
that the TFP effect is still the most important source for explaining the gap (y*H - y*L), as well as 
the conclusion that the gap looks set to persist into the future.   
                        B.  Steady-State Sources-of-Growth Estimates 
Tables 4 and 5 decompose the steady-state levels of output per worker into its long-run 
capital and Harrodian TFP components.   For the sake of completeness, we now return to Table 
1a and add the sources-of-growth rates decomposition implied by the steady-state framework.  
The steady-state analogue to Table 1a can be calculated from the basic parameters and estimates 
of the steady-state growth, since, along the steady-state path, output per worker, y*, and capital   26 
 
per worker, k*, grow at the same rate λ.  In other words, Harrodian productivity is the sole 
driver of the steady-state growth in output per worker in the neoclassical model.  Thus, the first 
column of a steady-state analogue to Table 1a would record the λ appropriate for each country, 
and Harrodian decomposition in the fourth and fifth columns would have the values 0 (for the 
capital-deepening effect) and λ (for the TFP effect), since all capital formation is induced 
accumulation and is assigned to TFP.  This represents the true picture of growth, conditional on 
accepting the validity of the experiment with the neoclassical model. 
In the steady-state version of the standard sources-of-growth model developed by Solow, 
the growth rate of output per worker is y* and the capital-deepening effect is (1- β) k*, and the 
TFP effect is the residual y* - (1- β) k*.  This implies that the Hicksian decomposition would 
record (1- β)λ for the capital effect and βλ for the TFP contribution.  These are not the correct 
numbers with which to assess the relative contribution of each effect, and this establishes the fact 
the Solow residual growth model, so widely used in empirical growth theory, is asymptotically 
biased.  Again, this bias is the counterpart of the simultaneous equations bias arising is 
econometrics from the endogeneity of capital. 
                                                           V.  Conclusion  
  Our analysis points to the persistently low levels of technological efficiency as the 
proximate source of the gap between the rich and poorer countries.  In this, we confirm many 
other studies of this issue.  We have not attempted to explain the causes of the technology gap, 
be they due to institutional and environmental factors, the externalities associated with capital 
formation, or whatever.   We have chosen, instead, to examine the prior issue of how to measure 
the gap, and have compared different techniques and assumptions using a common set of data.  
This examination has led us to the following conclusions.   27 
 
  First, the conventional analysis of differential growth rates needs to be supplemented by a 
parallel analysis of growth levels.  Capital deepening explains more than half of the growth rate 
of output per worker in a majority of countries, while TFP explains more than half of the 
corresponding gap.  Only in the rapid-growth Tiger countries does TFP growth outweigh capital 
formation, and then only by a small margin.   
  Second, the Hicks and Harrod ways of measuring the relative levels of the technology 
gap are both relevant, but they are relevant for answering different questions.  The former 
measures the extra output that could be obtained from the current quantities of capital and labor 
by moving to a higher level of TFP, while the latter includes the additional output arising from 
the savings generated by the gain in productive efficiency.  The latter is larger and is relevant 
from understanding the overall impact of TFP, but if the goal is to understand the causes of a low 
level of productive efficiency, per se, the Hicksian approach seems better suited to the task. 
  Third, in the endogenous growth approach, the induced-technology effect appears as a 
shift in the production function in the conventional Hicks-Solow measurement framework, so a 
positive gap in measured TFP is not inconsistent with the endogenous growth model.  Indeed, 
endogenous growth effects are among the factors than can be adduced to explain the gap. 
  Fourth, the measurement procedures used in the literature to measure the income and 
technology gaps are inherently backward looking.  A large income gap between rich and poor 
countries is less of a concern if the growth paths of the two will converge in the future.  This can 
only be learned from a modeling exercise that endogenizes the growth path, rather than taking 
the sources of growth as being exogenously determined as in the Solow residual model.  We use 
the neoclassical model for this purpose, and develop a steady-state decomposition of output per 
worker into capital deepening and Harrodian-TFP components.  We find that this forward-  28 
 
looking model predicts that the large gap will not close in the future for most of the developing 
countries unless they are able to significantly improve both the growth rates of the capital per 
worker and TFP.  This conclusion must be tempered by the highly abstract nature of the 
neoclassical growth model, but the size of the predicted long-run gaps are suggestive of the 
potential magnitude of future income gaps.  The steady-state analysis is also useful in pointing 
out the existence of an asymptotic bias in the conventional Solow approach to the sources of 
growth. 
  Finally, it is important to emphasize, once again, that there are significant gaps in the 
data.  The problem is most apparent in the implausibly low labor shares implied by national 
accounting data for lower income countries, and the resulting practice of imposing a common 
two-thirds share on all countries.  The output elasticities of capital and labor, as proxied by the 
share, are a key determinant of output growth, and the consequences of using different measures 
of the labor share are evident in the estimates of Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c of this paper.  It is 
intellectually disturbing that our understanding of the growth process should rest on such shaky 
data foundations.  And, data issues are by no means limited to the problem with measured 
income shares.  The accuracy of capital measures is also an issue, particularly with the 
Bosworth-Collins point about the large difference that arises when national prices are substitutes 
for PPP price.  It would be well, in closing, to recall the words of Zvi Griliches, who observed:  
 
  “We [economists] ourselves do not put enough emphasis on the value of data and data 
collection in our training of graduate students and in the reward structure of our profession.  It is 
the preparation skill of the chef that catches the professional eye, not the quality of the materials 
in the meal, or the effort that went into procuring them.” (AER 1994) 
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                                                         TABLE 1a     
 
                                          SOURCES OF GROWTH 
                                              COMMON SHARES 
                                                        1970-2000 
   _________________________________________________________________    
 
                                      CONVENTIONAL (HICKS)                       HARROD 
   _________________________________________________________________                                 
 
      META                  AAGR         AAGR        AAGR               AAGR        AAGR                            
   COUNTRY               Y/L              K/L             TFP                    K/L            TFP 
  __________________________________________________________________  
   
   Low Income             0.17%         0.25%         -0.07%          0.28%      -0.11% 
   Low-Middle             1.01%         0.61%       0.40%          0.41%       0.60% 
   Upper-Middle  0.99%         0.59%       0.40%          0.39%       0.60%  
   New Tigers       3.79%         1.70%       2.09%         0.68%        3.12% 
   Old Tigers    4.89%         2.37%       2.52%         1.13%        3.76% 
   High     1.95%         1.00%       0.95%         0.53%        1.42% 
    _________________________________________________________________  
     AAGR = Average Annual Growth Rate 
 
                                                        TABLE 1  b   
  
                                          SOURCES OF GROWTH 
                                                       1970-2000 
                                            MEASURED SHARES  
   ______________________________________________________________      
 
                                    CONVENTIONAL (HICKS)                     HARROD 
   ______________________________________________________________                                 
 
      META                AAGR            AAGR       AAGR             AAGR       AAGR                            
   COUNTRY             Y/L                 K/L           TFP                   K/L           TFP 
   ______________________________________________________________  
   
   Low Income             0.17%        0.52%      -0.35%        1.37%      -1.19% 
   Low-Middle             1.01%         1.17%      -0.16%              1.45%      -0.44% 
   Upper-Middle          0.99%        1.05%           -0.06%              1.14%      -0.15%     
   New Tigers              3.79%        3.53%            0.26%              2.97%        0.83% 
   Old Tigers              4.89%        3.92%            0.97%              2.76%        2.13%  
   High                         1.95%         1.36%            0.58%              0.88%       1.07% 
    ______________________________________________________________  
    AAGR = Average Annual Growth Rate 
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                                                        TABLE 1c     
  
                                          SOURCES OF GROWTH 
                                                       1970-2000 
                                   RODRIGUEZ-ORTEGA SHARES  
   ______________________________________________________________      
 
                                    CONVENTIONAL (HICKS)                     HARROD 
   ______________________________________________________________                                 
 
      META                AAGR            AAGR       AAGR             AAGR       AAGR                            
   COUNTRY             Y/L                 K/L           TFP                   K/L           TFP 
   ______________________________________________________________  
   
   Low Income             0.17%        0.38%      -0.20%        0.59%      -0.41% 
   Low-Middle             1.01%         0.79%       0.22%              0.62%        0.39% 
   Upper-Middle          0.99%        0.68%            0.31%              0.49%       0.50%     
   New Tigers              3.79%        2.49%            1.31%              1.27%       2.52% 
   Old Tigers              4.89%        2.67%            2.23%              1.36%       3.54%   
   High                         1.95%         1.00%            0.95%              0.53%       1.42% 
    ______________________________________________________________  




                                                        TABLE 2 
   
                       LEVELS OF GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY 
                                                      1970-2000 
                                             COMMON SHARES  
   ______________________________________________________________                                   
 
      META                LEVEL        LEVEL       LEVEL       LOG      LOG      LOG                       
   COUNTRY              Y/L          CCD-TFP    CD-TFP       Y/L        K/L       TFP 
   ______________________________________________________________  
     
   Low Income             6.05%      19.84%    19.84%        7.76       2.61      5.15 
   Low-Middle           22.46%      43.41%    43.41%        9.08       3.14      5.93     
   Upper-Middle        44.47%      63.30%    63.30%        9.76       3.45      6.31     
   New Tigers              8.50%       23.57%    23.57%        8.09       2.78      5.31   
   Old Tigers            49.53%      67.24%    67.24%        9.83       3.48      6.35      
   High                     100.00%     100.00%  100.00%      10.57       3.81      6.77 
    ______________________________________________________________  
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                                                        TABLE 3 
  
                        COMPARISON OF STEADY-STATE AND ACTUAL 
                                 LEVELS OF OUTPUT PER WORKER, 2000                                          
                                                    COMMON SHARES  
   ______________________________________________________________                                   
   
                                             STEADY                                   REMAINING        
            META                         STATE              ACTUAL             GAP                 
     COUNTRY                           y*                        y                 (y*-y)/y*                    
   ______________________________________________________________  
   
   Low Income                   $2,452                 $2,340                 5%           
 Low-Middle                 $9,924                 $8,811               11%                   
   Upper-Middle              $18,617               $17,402     7%                   
   New Tigers                      $7,059                 $3,531               51%                
 Old Tigers                      $26,383               $20,905              23%                    







                                                             TABLE 4     
     
                      DECOMPOSITION OF STEADY-STATE OUTPUT GAPS  
                      INTO CAPITAL-DEEPENING AND TFP COMPONENTS 
                                 ALONG HIGH-INCOME GROWTH PATH 
                                            COMMON SHARES, 2000  
   ______________________________________________________________                                   
      
                                                                             CAPITAL-         HARROD           
                                                    TOTAL         DEEPENING            TFP 
                META                           GAP                   GAP                   GAP               
            COUNTRY                  (y*H – y*i)           (y*H – y*if)          (y*if – y*i)                     
   ______________________________________________________________  
 
     Low Income               $56,783               $1,743               $55,040        
     Low-Middle                     $48,393           $4,570               $43,823             
     Upper-Middle                  $38,926           $5,282               $33,644             
     New Tigers                     $47,648           $10             $47,639             
Old Tigers                        $16,029               $36             $15,993               
     High                               $0                       $0                      $0                 
    ______________________________________________________________  
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                                                        TABLE 5 
    
    PERCENTAGE DECOMPOSITION OF STEADY-STATE INCOME GAPS  
                 INTO CAPITAL-DEEPENING AND TFP COMPONENTS 
                                  WITH DIFFERENT GROWTH PATHS                  
                                            COMMON SHARES, 2000  
  
     ______________________________________________________________                                   
 
                                 HIGH  INCOME      ACTUAL INCOME       AVERAGE 
                                          PATH                          PATH                       PATH 
      META                       %            %                 %           %               %             % 
   COUNTRY           CAPITAL   TFP         CAPITAL  TFP         CAPITAL   TFP     
     ______________________________________________________________  
     
   Low Income                 3%         97%              44%        56%             23%     77%                                                 
   Low-Middle                 9%         91%              36%        64%             23%     77%    
   Upper-Middle            14%         86%               31%       69%             23%      77% 
   New Tigers                  0%       100%                 0%     100%               0%    100%  
   Old Tigers                  0%       100%                 0%     100%               0%    100% 
      ______________________________________________________________  
 
 
                                                           TABLE 6 
  
                       COMPARISON OF STEADY-STATE PARAMETERS 
                                        AVERAGE VALUES 1970-2000 
                                                 
   ______________________________________________________________________                           
 
                                                                                           
      META                           LABOR'S                  SAVING        LABOR       POPULATION 
   COUNTRY                        SHARE                      RATE         GROWTH      GROWTH   
                               βSTD      βMEASURED     βR-O             σ                    η 
   ______________________________________________________________________  
   
   Low Income       0.667        0.294         0.493         0.093            0.024          0.026 
   Low-Middle       0.667        0.367         0.576         0.144            0.027          0.024      
   Upper-Middle    0.667        0.412         0.618          0.178           0.025          0.020      
   New Tigers        0.667        0.316         0.518          0.281           0.021          0.017 
   Old Tigers         0.667        0.455         0.630          0.281           0.024          0.013      
   High                   0.667        0.548         0.667          0.231           0.011          0.007 
    ______________________________________________________________________ 
βSTD = Standard approach; βMEASURED = As reported; βR-O = As implied by Rodriguez-Ortega 
(2006)   36 
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Table A.1. Basic Statistics and Countries, Organized by Meta Country 
 
HIGH INCOME  DPOP  Y/L  Y/L  DY/L  I/Y  K/L  K/L  DK/L  Y/POP  Y/POP  DY/POP
  1970-2000  1970  2000  1970-2000  1970-2000 1970  2000 1970-2000 1970  2000 1970-2000
Australia 0.013  34747  51568  0.013  0.238  86703 148660  0.017  14820  25559  0.018 
Austria 0.003  26736  50591  0.021  0.260  66469 169797  0.030  11176  23676  0.024 
Belgium 0.002  32427  56752  0.018  0.231  81200 176457  0.025  12143  23781  0.022 
Canada 0.012  34692  52295  0.013  0.228  61994 152421  0.029  14102  26904  0.021 
Cyprus  0.008  12603  39218  0.037  0.249  34347 92786 0.032  5275 17742 0.039 
Denmark 0.003  33218  48255  0.012  0.229  83723 151198  0.019  16038  26608  0.016 
Finland 0.004  23899  47281  0.022  0.260  64823 145963  0.026  11412  23792  0.024 
France 0.005  28960  49136  0.017  0.246  65718 160775  0.029  12336  22358  0.019 
Greece 0.006  21755  33783  0.014  0.247  50713 103785 0.023  8441  14614  0.018 
Iceland 0.010  25205  45055  0.019  0.258  77138 138571  0.019  10925  24777  0.026 
Ireland 0.008  19079  65054  0.040  0.192  28880 115744  0.045  7260  26381  0.042 
Israel 0.024  24021  38762  0.015  0.271  54458 113059  0.024  8837  16954  0.021 
Italy 0.002  28883  53949  0.020  0.233  74156 169291  0.027  11294  21780  0.021 
Japan 0.007  18098  38737  0.025  0.322  34551 161357  0.050  11474  24675  0.025 
Luxembourg 0.008  39277  103133  0.031  0.225  115514 243753  0.024  15121  43989  0.034 
Netherlands 0.006  33112  52230  0.015  0.234  84187 152928  0.019  13320  24313  0.019 
New Zealand  0.010  35083  39360  0.004  0.211  78165 115780  0.013  13665  18816  0.010 
Norway 0.005  27024  54032  0.022  0.318  91446 200385  0.025  11188  27060  0.028 
Portugal  0.004  14823  35008  0.028  0.213  25056 96372 0.043  6296 15923 0.030 
Spain 0.005  23675  44113  0.020  0.242  47853 134732  0.033  9076  18047  0.022 
Sweden 0.003  31990  45453  0.011  0.213  79456 133786  0.017  14828  23635  0.015 
Switzerland 0.004  43346  47412  0.003  0.266  129962 192283  0.013  20611  26414  0.008 
UK 0.002  26272  44649  0.017  0.181  58109 113065  0.021  12085  22190  0.020 
USA 0.010  38432  64537  0.017  0.197  60506 161391  0.032  16351  33293  0.023 
AVERAGE 0.007  29108  52211  0.020  0.240  57171 154321 0.033  13290 26595  0.023 
                   
LOW INCOME (up to YPOP 3,000 in year 2000)             
Angola  0.023  5767  3050  -0.021  0.075  4223  3428 -0.007 3329  1612 -0.023 
Bangladesh  0.022  2243  3187  0.011  0.098  3193  3707 0.005 1105 1684 0.014 
Benin  0.028  2041  2489  0.006  0.074 816 2079 0.030 1094  1214 0.003 
Bolivia  0.022  6036  6829  0.004  0.094  8409  9053 0.002 2498 2724 0.003 
Burkina  Faso  0.022  1159  1939  0.017  0.099 717 2509 0.040  669  957  0.012 
Burundi  0.021  1467  990  -0.013  0.057 326 1028 0.037  848  523  -0.016 
Cameroon  0.026  2552  4125  0.015  0.078  1445  3981 0.033 1580 2042 0.008 
Central African Rep.  0.022  3964  2144  -0.020  0.045  2529  1959  -0.008  2240  1045  -0.025 
Chad 0.024  2352  1837  -0.008  0.089  4196  2285  -0.020  1180  909  -0.008 
Comoros 0.024  4811  3498  -0.010  0.078  3005  4090  0.010  2353  1578  -0.013 
Congo  0.028  1612  3686  0.027  0.173  4476  4968 0.003  929  1808 0.021 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.034  4823  4679  -0.001  0.076  3547  4179  0.005  2391  1869  -0.008 
DR  Congo  0.029  1835  252  -0.064 0.052  702 636 -0.003  1056  118 -0.071 
Ethiopia  0.026  1293  1483  0.004 0.041  763 787 0.001 608  635 0.001 
Gambia  0.033  2104  2393  0.004  0.064 451 2044 0.049 1113  1217 0.003 
Ghana 0.026  2277  2775  0.006  0.073  3091  2360  -0.009  1282  1351  0.002 
Guinea 0.021  4304  5977  0.011  0.113  10496 7794  -0.010  2282  2831  0.007 
Guinea  Bissau  0.027  577  1287  0.026 0.206  2628  2859  0.003 332  688 0.024 
Haiti 0.017  1827  5569  0.036  0.051 523 1834 0.040  930  2416 0.031 
Honduras 0.029  5608  5415  -0.001  0.127  6318  10234  0.016  1861  2050  0.003 
Kenya  0.031  1450  2476  0.017  0.108  2072  2743 0.009  821  1244 0.013 
Lesotho 0.021  1730  3365  0.021  0.189  536  10260  0.095  883  1592  0.019   40 
 
LOW INCOME  DPOP  Y/L  Y/L  DY/L  I/Y  K/L  K/L  DK/L  Y/POP  Y/POP  DY/POP
  1970-2000  1970  2000  1970-2000  1970-2000 1970  2000 1970-2000 1970  2000 1970-2000
Madagascar  0.026  2546  1772  -0.012 0.028  896 741 -0.006  1274  836 -0.014 
Malawi  0.027  871  1631  0.020 0.138  1337  1722  0.008 455  784 0.018 
Mali  0.023  1485  2033  0.010 0.075  1812  1896  0.001 784  969 0.007 
Mauritania  0.024  3397  2912  -0.005  0.067 761 2892 0.043 1881  1447 -0.008 
Mozambique 0.020  2807  2000  -0.011  0.027  615  875  0.011  1571  1037  -0.013 
Nepal  0.023  1511  3144  0.024  0.135 824 5028 0.058  816  1459 0.019 
Nicaragua  0.028  12280  4367  -0.033  0.117  10451 9274 -0.004 3980  1767 -0.026 
Niger 0.031  2653  1823  -0.012  0.073  2052  1501  -0.010  1519  875  -0.018 
Nigeria  0.028  1997  1479  -0.010  0.089 781 2383 0.036 1113  707  -0.015 
Papua  New  Guinea  0.023  5247  5924  0.004  0.124  6473  9592 0.013 2862 2866 0.000 
Rwanda  0.027  1676  1786  0.002 0.039  325 971 0.035 887  895 0.000 
Senegal  0.027  2949  3389  0.004  0.072  2758  2977 0.002 1627 1622 0.000 
Sierra  Leone  0.021  3649  1910  -0.021  0.033 645 1468 0.026 1496  695  -0.025 
Tanzania, U. Rep. of  0.029  1056  938  -0.004  0.243  2356  2405  0.001  565  482  -0.005 
Togo 0.026  3109  2149  -0.012  0.078  1129  2784  0.029  1397  870  -0.015 
Uganda  0.026  1144  1835  0.015 0.023  161 537 0.039 608  941 0.014 
Zambia 0.028  2946  2141  -0.010  0.169  8255  4457  -0.020  1335  892  -0.013 
Zimbabwe 0.028  3723  5127  0.010  0.199  9226  10738  0.005  2155  2486  0.005 
AVERAGE 0.026  2239  2359  0.002  0.095 2142 2843  0.009  1176  1138  -0.001 
                   
LOW-MID (from YPOP 3,001 to YPOP 6,000 in year 2000)           
Algeria 0.026  13369  14527  0.003  0.190  16093 29706  0.020  3433  4896  0.011 
Cape Verde  0.016  4061  10078  0.029  0.171  4652  15448  0.039  1387  4027  0.034 
Colombia 0.020  7651  11477  0.013  0.116  7860  16847  0.025  3159  5383  0.017 
Costa Rica  0.025  13639  14827  0.003  0.151  13398 26203  0.022  4181  5870  0.011 
Dominican Republic  0.021  7488  16173  0.025  0.138  6156  20717  0.039  2018  5270  0.031 
Ecuador 0.024  7069  9023  0.008  0.189  16442 22049  0.009  2292  3468  0.013 
Egypt  0.021  5603  10970  0.022  0.076  2553  7379 0.034 1970 4184 0.024 
El Salvador  0.018  12578  10368  -0.006  0.072  7532  10390  0.010  4141  4435  0.002 
Equatorial Guinea  0.015  8094  8641  0.002  0.130  3091  15860  0.053  3758  3604  -0.001 
Fiji 0.014  11620  13580  0.005  0.147 19314 24384  0.008  3433  4971  0.012 
Guatemala 0.025  8673  10611  0.007  0.081  6972  10314  0.013  2991  3914  0.009 
Guyana 0.002  8628  8243  -0.001  0.163  23071 18465  -0.007  2432  3532  0.012 
Iran 0.026  18304  19560  0.002  0.197  17202 38541  0.026  5225  5995  0.004 
Jamaica 0.011  10177  7310  -0.011  0.173  24743 21030  -0.005  3867  3693  -0.001 
Jordan 0.038  8120  13087  0.015  0.146  6841  21156  0.036  2228  3895  0.018 
Morocco 0.020  6815  9301  0.010  0.139  5460  14654  0.032  2261  3717  0.016 
Namibia 0.025  13955  14689  0.002  0.182  26608 28559  0.002  4770  4529  -0.002 
Pakistan  0.027  2729  5360  0.022  0.117  4024  6412 0.015  943  2008 0.024 
Paraguay 0.027  6183  10439  0.017  0.121  3930  15810  0.045  2874  4684  0.016 
Peru 0.021  11927  10095  -0.005  0.170  26080 25698  0.000  4686  4589  -0.001 
Philippines 0.023  6548  8374  0.008  0.152  8197  15312  0.020  2396  3425  0.012 
Sri Lanka  0.014  3745  7646  0.023  0.119  2090  10726  0.053  1557  3300  0.024 
AVERAGE 0.024  7374  9984  0.010  0.143 8417  15835 0.021  2560  3846  0.013 
                   
UPPER-MID (from YPOP 6,001 and above in year 2000, excluding OECD + Israel)       
Argentina  0.014  19967  25670  0.008  0.173  37276 58223 0.014  9265 11006 0.006 
Barbados  0.004  15935  32961  0.023  0.148  31065 41302 0.009  6040 16415 0.032 
Botswana  0.029 3126 23926  0.066 0.188  2896  32356  0.078  1193  8241  0.062 
Brazil 0.019  11006  19220  0.018  0.207  18028 43954  0.029  3620  7190  0.022 
Chile 0.015  15345  25084  0.016  0.151  25676 49286  0.021  4794  9926  0.023 
Gabon 0.029  11293  17645  0.014  0.140  8597  23958  0.033  6857  8402  0.007 
Mauritius 0.012  13162  32241  0.029  0.126  13700 39386 0.034  4005 13932 0.040 
Mexico 0.022  17965  21111  0.005  0.182  27956 46815  0.017  5522  8762  0.015   41 
 
UPPER-MID DPOP  Y/L  Y/L  DY/L  I/Y  K/L  K/L  DK/L  Y/POP  Y/POP  DY/POP
  1970-2000  1970  2000  1970-2000  1970-2000 1970  2000 1970-2000 1970  2000 1970-2000
Panama 0.021  11357  14382  0.008  0.207  17391 37650  0.025  3824  6066  0.015 
Seychelles  0.013 8470 23552  0.033 0.149  4934  44543  0.071  4091  10241  0.030 
South Africa  0.021  18415  18488  0.000  0.120  23582 25070  0.002  6878  7541  0.003 
Syria 0.031  26235  28817  0.003  0.190  34728 14163  -0.029  7542  9193  0.006 
Trinidad and Tobago  0.009  19842  25188  0.008  0.106  13058 33090  0.030  6582  11175  0.017 
Tunisia  0.020 8573 17124  0.022 0.160  20720 26610  0.008  2568  6776  0.031 
Turkey  0.020 8017 14125  0.018 0.162  8040  29528  0.042  3619  6832  0.021 
Uruguay 0.006  13579  21150  0.014  0.121  19073 34882  0.019  6131  9622  0.015 
Venezuela 0.026  35399  15705  -0.026  0.168  44808 36511  -0.007  10528  6420  -0.016 
AVERAGE 0.020  14566  19492  0.009  0.159 22076 40132  0.019  5184  7924  0.014 
                   
OLD TIGERS                   
Hong Kong, SAR of 
China   0.018  15587  51469  0.039  0.249  28329 138086  0.051  6506  26699  0.046 
Korea, Republic of  0.012  7676  31239  0.045  0.311  9584  98424  0.075  2716  15876  0.057 
Singapore 0.021  15085  50809  0.039  0.454  32892 187383  0.056  5279  28869  0.055 
Taiwan, P. of China  0.013  7282  42402  0.057  0.194  6392  78537  0.081  2790  19034  0.062 
AVERAGE  0.013 8513 36922  0.048 0.302  11132 102174 0.074  3120  18312  0.059 
                   
NEW TIGERS                   
China 0.014  1583  6175  0.044  0.178  1564  10624  0.062  815  3747  0.049 
India  0.020  2454  5587  0.027  0.118  2470  6729 0.032 1073 2479 0.027 
Indonesia 0.019  2865  7677  0.032  0.146  1635  13772  0.069  1087  3642  0.039 
Malaysia  0.025 8377 23994  0.034 0.223  10090 54710  0.055  2884  9919  0.040 
Thailand  0.017 3758 11308  0.036 0.309  7486  36890  0.051  1822  6857  0.043 
AVERAGE 0.017  2036  6355  0.037  0.195 2052 10587  0.054  966  3367  0.041 
Note: The averages have been computed based on the meta-country averages. For example, output per worker in 
2000 has been obtained by first summing income and workers separately for a given meta country, thereafter 
dividing total income with total workers and then dividing this ratio by the number of countries. An alternative way, 
leading to a slightly different result, is to first compute income per worker for each country, sum the country results 
and then divide this total by the number of countries. 
DPOP = Average annual growth rate (AAGR) of population; Y/L = GDP per worker; DY/L = AAGR of GDP per 
worker; I/Y = Investment share in GDP; K/L = capital-labor ratio; DK/L = AAGR of capital-labor ratio (i.e. capital 
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Capital stocks 
We use a perpetual inventory method (PIM) to estimate the stock of capital from the investment 
data (the capital stock is denoted K05+S in Figure A.1.). Under the PIM, the stock of capital at 
the end of year t that is available for production in the following year, Kt+1, is equal to the 
depreciated amount of capital left over from the preceding year, (1-δ)Kt, plus the amount of new 
capital added through investment during the year, It: 
   
, ) 1 ( 1 I K K t t t + − = + δ                  ( A . 1 )  
 
The δ denotes the depreciation rate here, as in the text.  By substituting backward in time to some 
initial period, equation A.1 can be expressed in terms of the depreciated stream of investment 
plus the initial capital stock, K0 : 
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− δ δ                 (A.2) 
 
This method of estimating the stock of capital requires time-series data on real investment, which 
we obtain from the Penn World Tables 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002), in purchasing 
power parity 1996 US dollars.  We have no information as to country-specific depreciation rates, 
so we assume a common 5 percent rate for each country. 
  To obtain a starting value for the capital stock of each country, we assume the country is 
at its steady state capital-output ratio. The steady-state benchmark value is obtained from the 
equation: 
 
), /( δ + = g i k                               (A.3) 
 
where k = K/Y (i.e. capital-output ratio), g = the growth rate of real Y (i.e. growth of GDP), and i 
= I/Y (i.e. investment rate).  The steady-state growth of GDP (g) and the investment rate (i), 
respectively, are calculated as the annual average over 10 years (1960-1969). Inserting these into 
(A.3) gives k and the benchmark is obtained by multiplying k by initial GDP. Thereafter, we add 
10 years of investment to the benchmark and this marks the initial capital stock, K0.     
  We have also investigated the robustness of this procedure against two other 
computational methods. The first alternative is to use the steady-state approach discussed above 
to compute the initial capital stock, K1970, and thereafter apply the perpetual inventory method to 
the remaining years (KS). Our second procedure is to use the perpetual inventory method, but 
this time without the steady-state approach to obtaining a benchmark, i.e. the benchmark is zero 
in 1960. The accumulation of 10 years of investment is then taken to represent the initial capital 
stock in 1970 (K05). 
Figure A.1 shows how the three capital stocks actually tend to converge over time and 
this leads us to have faith in our choice of calculating capital stock, implying a reasonably high 
degree of robustness to our method of estimating the initial level of capital. 
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Table A.2. Comparison of Capital Stocks Based on PPP ($) and National Prices ($). 
 
                             PPP, $                                      National prices, $ 
Meta-countries           AAGR    Meta-countries          AAGR 
    
Low        0.61   Low        0.85
Low-Mid        1.94   Low-Mid         1.90
Upper-Mid        1.70   Upper-Mid        1.47
Old Tigers        7.12   Old Tigers       6.84
New Tigers  5.44   New Tigers  5.16
High   3.30   High  2.53
AAGR = Average annual growth rates in percent for the period 1970-2000.   
Note: The difference between the two columns, when multiplied by .33, gives the change in TFP 
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Labor shares 
It is standard in cross-country analysis to assume common labor shares across countries, with a 
two-thirds share commonly assigned to labor (Gollin (2002)).  However, the labor shares are 
calculated from published data reveal very large differences across countries.
16 Figure A.2 
reveals just how large the differences are, and how far short of the two-thirds share the actual 
estimates are. In general, labor shares increase with income level of the meta country, although 









                                                           
16 Data on labor shares are not available for all countries. The average labor shares are therefore based on meta 
countries excluding the following countries: HIGH Cyprus; LOW Bangladesh, Comoros, D.R. Congo, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Guinea and Nepal; LOW-MID Cape Verde, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Pakistan and 
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